Caught in the middle: should the World Trade Organization settle environmental disputes? by Schmidt, C W
lhe 1990s have emerged as the
decalde of econiomic globalizationl.
More than ever, countries are part
ofa global economy that demaneds the elimi-
niationi oftrade barriers and the smooth flow
of goods and services from one place to
aniothler. But even as counatries seek the bene-
f--its ofopeni trade, they find themselves hav-
ing to resist imports they find undesirable.
In socme cases, the overriding concern ofthe
importinlg country is that a product or class
of products could threaten the health of its
enls\ii-onnwaenit or people. The restilt canl be a
tiade qtiarrel that pits one country s desire
foi- miiarket access againist aniother country S
Insistencce on sovereigntx over its own
dom1iestic environmiienital policies.
Since its inception in 1 995, the World
ITrade ()iganizationi (WTO) has arbitrated
trade disptites between its members inlvolvinlg
pLblic healthi and the eniviroiinmenit. The
WTo is the only international organization
thalt deals solely with the developmenit,
implemlentatiotn, and cnforcement of global
rules of trade. Headquartered in G'eneva,
Switzerland, the \VTO was established as a
sticcessor to the General Agreement oni
ITariffs and Trade (GA-FT), which was itself
established in the ssake of the Second World
War. Part of the role of the WTO is to
decide whether tinilateral actions by \VTO
members such as trade bans or restrictionis
violate internationial free trade rules anbd to
authorize penalties againist menmbers thlat aie
fouLnd to be noncomnpliant with suLch rules.
Recently the W'IC) has come under criti-
cism by those who believe its emilplhasis on
free trade undermines nationial efforts geared
toward enivironmeiicnital protectioni. I'ublic
inlterest groups, in particular, have expressed
concerin that the \X1/O has vet to uphold anxv
of the environmental programs and meastires
challenged as trade barriers by WTO i0l mem-
bers, leadinig these groups to question
whether the organiizationi has the mandate-
and hence the will to uiphold cenvironlimlcnl-
tal priorities over trade. One of their chief
comiplainiits is that the W\TX1O conidLicts itS
negotiationis behind a sveil of secrecy thlat
effectisely exclutdes public participatiot).
Critics allege thalt, bs closing its doois to thlc
ptublic, the " I () dTendies itself im1portanit
infornmationi that could help it make better
decisionls garding priblic heacltlh an(d the
Cns ironnmenit. F'Lrtherimore, these groups
qticstioni whether the WO 1ohas the technical
capacity to resolse enironmental conlflictPs
based onl scicentific diSpuLteCS.
A numiiber ofreccnt WTO decisionts have
highlighted concerins to this effect, includling(
an October 1998 rilin1g that a U.S. bain on
imlports of slhrimiip catight without ttirtle
excltider desices xssv as atiunnecessary trade
barrier that the Unitcd States must modify.
In this case, the WT() determided that the
ban xvas applied unfairly becatise the United
States hlad givenLI itin Atmericanll cotlitriies
three years to implement the devices whereas
India, Thailand, Malay sia, and Pakistan wveie
given only four imionths. Another contentiou.s
WT 0 decisioln involved a 1 998 ruliln
against the Euiropcan Uliiioti (FU), wiich lihad
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previously imposed a ban on hormone-treat-
ed beef imports from the United States and
Canada. In this case, the EU's claim that
growth hormones in cattle might cause devel-
opmental, neurotoxic, genotoxic, and car-
cinogenic.effects in human consumers was
rejected by the WTO, which ruled that the
evidence of adverse health effects presented
by the EU was insufficient to justify a trade
barrier. In a subsequent move that led some
to question the WTO's credibility, the EU
disregarded the ruling and upheld the ban
anyway, prompting the WTO to authorize
$116.8 million in compensatory tariffs bythe
United States against the EU in May 1999.
Whether the WTO will preside over a
current dispute involving exports ofgenetical-
lyengineered crops from the United States to
the EU remains to be seen. These crops are
highly unpopular among European con-
sumers, who often refer to them as
"Frankenstein foods." To date, the EU has
approved 16 varieties ofgenetically modified
plants for import. But in response to public
fears about health and ecological effects, EU
authorities have suspended the introduction
of any new varieties into European markets
and have imposed an eco-labeling require-
ment on all genetically engineered imports.
The effects ofthese actions on U.S. farmers
could bedevastating.
"Problems arise because valid health and
environmental measures often have the sec-
ondary effect ofprotecting national produc-
ers, as is the case with hormone-treated
beef," says Matthew Stilwell, a Geneva-based
managing attorney with the- public interest
law firm Council for International
Environmental Law. "In this case, the EU
will argue that their regulation is a valid
health measure, while the United States
argues that it is merely thinly veiled protec-
tionism. TheWTO, as atradebody, is asked
to resolve these vexing questions-ones that
go to thevery basis ofnational policymaking
on central issues ofhealth and environment.
This brings up the question as to which
institution should make these decisions.
Should it be the WTO? And what level of
deference should be given to national laws to
protect health?"
Dispute Resolution attheWTO
Arbitration of trade quarrels at the WTO
takes place within a formal dispute resolu-
tion mechanism that determines whether a
country's actions violate any of 60 agree-
ments established by consensus among the
organization's 134 member nations. The res-
olution mechanism proceeds as follows: Ifa
compromise between the two parties can't
be reached, the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Body convenes a panel of three to five
experts in consultation with the opposing
countries. This panel can draw on a variety
of technical experts as it reviews the case.
Upon completing its review ofthe available
technical and legal evidence, the panel pre-
pares a report that is released to the public
and reviewed by all WTO members.
Following that review, the panel decides
whether the disputed measureviolatesWTO
agreements or obligations and issues a final
rule that either upholds the contested mea-
sure or requires that it be made to conform
with WTO regulations. Rulings can be
appealed, but successful appeals require the
consensus ofall WTO members to overturn
a panel or appellate body ruling. This
requirement is contentious because the pre-
vailing country is unlikely to vote to over-
turn a ruling that falls in its favor. Finally, if
the losing party refuses to comply with the
ruling, the complaining side can ask the
Dispute Settlement Body for permission to
impose limitedtradesanctions.
An example ofan agreement frequently
applied to environmental disputes is the
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Standards (SPS). This agreement was drafted
to ensure that national laws that protect
humans, animals, and plants from pests, dis-
eases, and harmful food additives aren't used
as disguised protectionism. The SPS agree-
ment was applied in the beefhormone case
and would likely be applied to genetically
modified crops as well, should that issue be
brought before the WTO. A key element to
resolvingdisputes underthe SPS agreement is
risk assessment. Countries trying to prove
that atrade ban doesn'tviolate the SPS agree-
ment must produce risk assessments showing
that the product they aim to restrict is capa-
ble of causing demonstrable harm. The
WTO has ruled that "it isn't sufficient for
governments to impose [regulations] simply
on the basis of [the] theoretical risk . .. that
underlies all scientific uncertainty." The
WTO says that risk assessments must find
evidence of "ascertainable" risk without too
much weight being lent to "unknown and
uncertain elements." However, there is no
minimally sufficient magnitude of risk that
regulators must find. Many WTO observers
are concerned about the scientific evidence
that dispute resolution panels bring to the
table when they review risk assessment con-
clusions. Problems emerge because most
stakeholders tend to want to interject their
own interpretations of the data. The most
vocal critics by far are thosewho feel they are
beingshutoutoftheprocess.
NegotiatingBehindClosed Doors?
Few would dispute the notion that trade
issues are sensitive; in fact, part of the
WTO's mission is to prevent military
conflicts that might arise from economic
disagreements. Countries therefore have a
certain incentive to prevent the release of
sensitive and proprietary information during
both the negotiation of trade agreements
and the disputes arising from them. But the
resultant aura of secrecy that appears to
shroud dispute resolutions in particular is
distressing to public-sector nongovernmental
organizations, which complain that they are
excluded from providing input during dis-
pute panel negotiations. Officials at the
United States Trade Representative (USTR)
have voiced similar concerns, and the
Clinton administration has warned that the
widely held perception that panel negotia-
tions take place behind closed doors under-
minespublicconfidence in theWTO.
However, a senior official with the Trade
and Environment Division at the WTO
counters that directing criticisms about secre-
cy (or "transparency," as it is commonly
termed) at the WTO is unfair because the
organization neither restricts member nations
from releasing documents to the public dur-
ing dispute settlements nor forces them to do
so. "The WTO does not prevent countries
from making their documents public. Each
country can do so with its own documents if
it so wishes. When countries do not do that,
it is those countries that are to blame and not
theWTO as an organization. Nothing in the
rules of the WTO says that there should be
secrecy," theofficial says.
John B. Weiner, an attorney with the
Washington, DC-based law firm Beveridge
and Diamond who practices in the area of
international trade and environmental law,
acknowledges that governments engaged in
dispute settlements can at any time release
their own panel submissions (but not those
of the opposing party without permission)
to the public. But the decision to consult
any organization prior to the release of the
panel's report rests solely with the govern-
ment itself. What this means is that even
though nongovernmental organizations may
want to participate in the dispute settlement
process, they are excluded unless their par-
ticipation is directly requested or otherwise
permitted by thepanel or one ofthe govern-
ments involved. At most, they can consult
with governments or submit their own
materials to panels. However, they cannot
attend or participate in actual panel sessions.
These groups often find themselves in the
frustrating position of sitting out negotia-
tions on the sidelines or participating with
onlylimited information.
Access toTechnicalExpertise at Issue
Public interest groups' frustration over lack
of access is compounded by their percep-
tion that dispute settlement panels, which
are usually composed oftrade lawyers, lack
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the expertise to understand technical envi-
ronmental data. Moreover, they claim that
the WTO often fails to consult appropriate
international organizations such as the
World Health Organization (WHO) and
the United Nations Environment
Programme. Part ofthe problem, they sug-
gest, is that the WTO is a new organiza-
tion that is still defining its territory in the
international policy landscape and that
working closely with other organizations
on technical environmental disputes might
be seen as relinquishing its authority.
Charlie Arden-Clarke, head of the Trade
and Investment Unit at theWorldWildlife
Fund's office in Gland, Switzerland, says,
"The WTO is a trade organization, and it
doesn't have environmental expertise in its
secretariat. It doesn't want to expand that
expertise because its focus is on liberalizing
trade and preventing protectionism; that's
its job. We find that when the WTO
makes its rulings, it doesn't fully consider
health and environmental measures
because it can't."
But neither VWTO representatives nor
officials at the USTR share the view that the
WTO fails to consult international environ-
mental organizations as it formulates its own
policies. A senior official at the USTR main-
tains that several international organizations
were consulted during preparation ofthe SPS
agreement. These organizations include the
Codex Alimentarius (an agency organized by
the United Nations and the WHO to set
global standards for food safety) aswell as the
United Nations Office for International
Zootics and the International Plant
Protection Convention (an independent
intergovernmental animal health organization
headquartered in Paris). Says a senior official
with the WTO's Agriculture and
Commodities Division in Geneva, "We do
confer with other organizations when we
think it makes sense to do so. WTO isn't
doing WHO's work and vice versa, but we
do conferwith them."
During the recent hormone-treated beef
negotiations, five technical experts with a
combined experience base inveterinary medi-
cine, toxicology, and risk assessment were
retained by the panel for consultation.
Among them was George Lucier, director of
the Environmental Toxicology Program at
the NIEHS, who noted that the experts were
able to consult freelywith oneanother as they
prepared their technical comments. In assess-
inghis experience as atechnical expert, Lucier
concluded that the panel in this case was
focused on scientific issues and that the sci-
ence, along with other trade-related issues,
was a critical determinant in the outcome of
the dispute. "I applaud [the WTO] for that,"
he says.
In the hormone-treated beef case, the
WTO conduded that based on its review of
the available risk assessments, potential
health threats were nonexistent and ruled
that the EU's trade ban was a protectionist
measure that violated the SPS agreement.
However, the EU ignored the WTO's con-
clusions regarding the scientific merits of its
case. The union responded with a 139-page
report-released to the public-that con-
cluded that six hormones including 17,B-
estradiol, progesterone, testosterone, zeranol,
trenbolone, and melengestrol acetate posed
risks to consumers, but with different levels
of evidence. The union also accepted the
retaliatory tariffs of the United States pend-
ing the results ofyet another series of risk
assessments it is conducting in hopes of
proving that there is sufficient health reason
to ban hormone-treated beef.
The fact that the EU continued its ban of
U.S. beef in spite of the W']TO ruling led
some to speculate that the credibility ofdis-
pute resolution at the WTO could be at
stake, especially if the EU's actions set a
precedent in which rulings are flouted rou-
tinely by countries on the losing end. When
asked whether this might be the case, WTO
officials countered that these concerns are
unfounded because measures designed to
address noncompliance among losing coun-
tries are built into the dispute resolution
framework. For example, in the hormone-
treated beef case, retaliatory measures were
authorized by the WTO and found to be
agreeable by the EU, the United States, and
Canada. The fact that the retaliation has pro-
ceeded smoothly among the countries has led
to agreement among WTO and USTR offi-
cials that the dispute resolution process, in
this case atleast, functioned as intended.
The PrecautionaryPrinciple
What the ruling failed to do was reassure the
concerns of EU consumers. Public interest
groups, not to mention much of the
European population, remain dissatisfied
with the conclusions of the WTO's panel.
Technologically enhanced foods-be they
hormone-treated beefor genetically modified
crops (which represent anotherlooming trade
dispute between the United States and the
EU)-are a big health concern among
Europeans. European leaders face a difficult
prospect in that on the one hand, their peo-
ple are demanding that technologically
enhanced food imports be denied entry,
while on the other, they have to deal with a
WTO dispute settlement framework that
rules in favorofhealth- orenvironment-based
trade bans only in the event that they can be
scientificallyjustified.
This essential conflict calls into question
the whole basis by which the WTO resolves
disputes involving environmental risk. Critics
ofthe current system have argued for greater
use of the precautionary principle, which
holds that in situations where serious or irre-
versible damage is possible, lack offull scien-
tific evidence should not stand in the way of
actions designed to prevent environmental
damage. The EU has in factsuggested that its
ban on hormone-treated beef, despite a lack
of conclusive evidence of adverse health
effects, was justified by the precautionary
principle, which it characterized as a "rule of
customaryenvironmental law."
Part ofthe problem is that there are dif-
feringopinions as to how to interpret the pre-
cautionary principle. The EU interpretation
is that, despite the lack of evidence today,
new risks may reveal themselves tomorrow,
and the prudent measure is to uphold a ban
until further studies are conducted.
Conversely, the United States counters that
application of the precautionary principle
doesn't warrant implementing conservative
measures based on zero evidence ofrisk. The
position ofthe United States is that issues of
scientific uncertainty are already addressed by
regulatoryagencies in theirpolicydecisions.
The prospect ofgiving greater weight to
the precautionary principle at the WTO is
not being taken lightly by its member
nations. The United States has maintained
that actions taken to restrict trade should be
based on some minimal evidence that risks
may in fact bevalid. Atstake, ofcourse, is the
U.S. genetically modified crop industry,
which could be hurt by further restrictions to
European markets. Lucier says that precau-
tionary measures are necessary to protect
public health, but he cautions against using
the precautionary principle in ways that lead
to excessive conservatism. Says one senior
official at theWTO, "Even when the precau-
tionary principle is better defined, there will
always be situations in which countries need
to put in place [perhaps] irrational trade
restrictions [in response to] strong public
opinion. The WTO is flexible enough to
allow them to do so, provided they compen-
sate their trading partners or allow themselves
to be subjected to retaliatory trade measures
in the event of a dispute [resolved against
them]."
Future use ofthe precautionary principle
maybe an agenda item at the next ministerial
meeting ofthe WTO, to be held in Seartle,
Washington, in November 1999. In the
meantime, it isdearthat theWTO faces con-
siderable challenges as it attempts to define its
role and responsibilities as both an agent for
free trade and an advocate of public health
andenvironmental protection.
CharlesW. Schmidt
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